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Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare: 
What to do? 
 
The international security environment has seemingly departed from a post-cold war  
period of everlasting peace and has instead evolved into a volatile and increasingly 
grey area of war and peace. Security challenges arising from both hybrid wars and 
hybrid threats are high on security agendas in Sweden and Europe as well as 
internationally. However, despite the attention there is a lack of research that 
addresses how such “new” wars and threats should be handled. While studies do 
exist on specific issues, a comprehensive approach to how hybrid wars and threats 
are to be handled is still lacking. This is particularly the case when it comes to the 
sharing of experiences between states. This workshop constituted a first step 
towards developing such a comprehensive approach. 
The workshop’s aim was to be a bridge across disciplinary boundaries as well as 
between researchers and practitioners within and outside Sweden; integrating each 
group’s extensive experiences and knowledge into a coherent whole. Besides 
producing and disseminating new knowledge, the intention of the workshop was to 
establish a foundation for long-term collaboration; the first step in the creation of a 
European Network on Hybrid Warfare Capabilities that can work across borders and 
link state of the art of research and practice. 
Although mainly a scientific workshop, a number of practitioners were invited, with a 
mix of presentations by academics and practitioners. This was intended to foster 
innovative and reflective discussions across the academic-practitioner divide. The 
workshop also aimed to develop new ideas associated with hybrid threats/warfare in 
order to facilitate future cooperation 
These proceedings include a summary of the key points made by the presenters, 
along with conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the ensuing 
discussions. Conference programme and a list of abstracts for the papers and 
presentations can be found in the appendix.   
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Summary of key points from the proceedings 
 
SESSION 1: The role of the armed forces 
 
Modelling hybrid warfare: a generic and holistic approach 
Patrick Cullen, NUPI 
 
• Academic analysis as to what constitutes Hybrid Warfare has yet to reach 
any consensus, although earlier definitions were too focused on non-state 
actors and kinetic means. 
 
• There is general agreement that Hybrid Warfare does include both multiple 
and synchronised threats that aim to target state vulnerabilities at different 
levels of intensity over time: 
 
 
 
Hybrid warfare in the mind of the Swedish officer: a multiple 
duality view of tactics and operational art  
Michael Gustafson, SEDU 
 
• Swedish Officer training is based on the 2015 curriculum and does not 
include Hybrid Warfare training. 
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• A survey of different officers demonstrated a wide variance in 
understanding of what Hybrid Warfare was and how relevant it should be 
for different parts of the Armed Forces. 
 
• Perhaps most worryingly, none of those surveyed questioned whether the 
current model of Hybrid Warfare was correct. 
 
Hybrid threats and warfare today and tomorrow: bringing the 
army (back) in 
Mikael Weissmann, SEDU 
 
• Hybrid Warfare blurs the distinction between civilian and combatant and 
both demands and permits all activities deemed necessary to achieve 
success. This could include full spectrum capabilities, including long 
distance weapons and Special Forces. The concept of strategic Key Terrain 
is also important, with increasingly potent Anti-Access Area Denial 
(A2AD) systems used to protect or threaten these areas. 
 
• Whether the threat today can be described as peer vs peer or as superior vs 
inferior is, in the context of Sweden, dependent on whether Sweden 
operates alone or as part of a coalition. 
 
• The role for the military in Hybrid Warfare will be varied, spanning the 
tactical to the strategic levels and including policing functions alongside 
more traditional military ones. 
 
Mission Organised Constructs to counter Hybrid Threats  
Scott Moreland, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
• Hybrid Warfare is being used by various actors who do not believe in a 
rules based world order to achieve strategic symmetry with western states. 
They believe that they have both the opportunity and an imperative to do so. 
 
• Hybrid Warfare capabilities include: the movement of conventional forces; 
nuclear force intimidation, economic and energy pressure; propaganda and 
disinformation, and cyber disruption and destabilisation. These capabilities 
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have been used as shaping instruments to create the conditions for 
conventional military intervention. 
 
Session 1 Conclusions: 
 
• Rather than searching for consensus in defining and describing Hybrid 
Warfare, it is more fruitful to instead consider how Hybrid Warfare targets 
state vulnerabilities and how states should best organise themselves to meet 
the threat.  Specifically: 
 
o States should conduct continual self-assessments to understand 
their current vulnerabilities. 
 
o States should enhance current threat assessments to understand 
how Hybrid Warfare capabilities are targeting those 
vulnerabilities (or not). 
 
 
SESSION 2: Cyber in a hybrid context 
 
Theory of Strategic Culture – a tool to explain Russian cyber 
threat perception?   
Martti J. Kari, University of Jyväskylä 
 
• The determinants of Russian Strategic Culture include history, geopolitics, 
ideology and religion. 
 
• Elements of Strategic Culture in Russia include: 
 
o   Authoritarian Rule. 
o   A sense of vulnerability. 
o   Threat Perception. 
o   A messianic mission to save Europe. 
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o   A sense of being a Great Power. 
o   A Clausewitzian approach and a belief in the utility 
of force. 
o   The concept of being permanently in conflict. 
o   The use of asymmetric capabilities to conduct 
Hybrid Warfare. 
• Russia believes that cyber threats to Russia are increasing and 
that they are not as technically capable as western states in 
this domain. This threat perception often leads to the 
establishment of offensive (hybrid) capabilities and activity 
(for example, perceived meddling in the Russian 2006 
election may have led to the alleged Russian meddling in the 
US 2016 election). 
 
Estonian defence league cyber unit as a hybrid national security 
actor 
Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology 
 
• The Estonian Defence League was described as a useful tool in countering 
Hybrid Warfare threats.   
 
• By drawing capability and talent from across Estonian society, whilst 
deliberately making assessment of the totality of that capability very 
difficult, the Estonian Defence League could serve as a useful example to 
other nations looking to expand their capabilities. 
 
The silicon hat hacker: using reinforcement learning in hybrid 
warfare  
Wayne Dalton, South African Military Academy 
 
• Can we use machines with humans to reduce our vulnerability to hybrid 
threats? Machine learning, particularly the ability to analyse and learn from 
‘big data’, has now matured to the point where machines can now 
outperform humans in a number of helpful tasks. This will: 
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o Allow humans to become more efficient and to be free to conduct 
more empathetic activities instead. 
o Drive consensus faster in detecting and attributing Hybrid 
Warfare activity. 
o Enhance cyber resilience by reducing cyber vulnerabilities. 
o Offer the chance to overmatch Hybrid Warfare capabilities. 
 
Session 2 Conclusions: 
 
• Individual states should adopt a progressive approach when building the 
capabilities necessary to counter hybrid threats, starting at the Joint level 
before moving to an Interagency and then Comprehensive Approach that 
also includes the private sector. 
 
• In terms of states working together, multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping 
operations offer valuable lessons, including: 
 
o The importance of shared understanding, agreed Measures of 
Effectiveness and an agreed approach under unified command. 
o Demonstrating the proven ability of UN organisations such as the 
UNDP and the OCHA to interface and coordinate together. 
o The utility of having a Joint Mission Analysis Centre. 
o The utility of the EU Operations Centre as a possible 
coordinating body. 
 
• If deterrence fails, then detection and attribution of Hybrid Warfare activity 
is extremely important in determining when and how states can respond. 
 
• If action to counter Hybrid Warfare is taken to protect another state, then 
the role of the Host Nation as the sovereign actor cannot be underestimated. 
As sovereign nations acting within their territories, Host Nations will also 
be able to undertake activity that supporting states will probably not be able 
to. 
 
• States should not underestimate and should instead seek to exploit the good 
will and significant capabilities within their civilian and private sectors. 
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SESSION 3: Russia’s neighbours 
 
 
Cyber Component of Asymmetric Warfare: The Georgian 
Experience 
Marina Malvenishvili, Chief specialist of development and foreign affairs section, 
Georgian Cyber Security Bureau, Ministry of Defence of Georgia  
 
The August 2008 war against Georgia by the Russian Federation combined cyber and 
conventional attacks against governmental, media and financial institutions. 
Moreover, the increasing dependence on ICT clearly demonstrated that Georgia’s 
national security could not be protected without the provision of cybersecurity.  
In the period after 2008, Georgia started to develop these cybersecurity capabilities 
and improve its IT resilience through: 
• Establishment of a relevant institutional framework, policy and legal base 
• Creation of national CERT  
• Establishment of a Cyber Security Bureau under the Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 
• Improved public awareness and the establishment of an educational base  
• Capacity building of staff and the implementation of software and hardware 
solutions 
• Establishment of international cooperation with NATO members and 
partner countries, as well as enhanced public-private partnership 
Hybrid War and the Abkhazian Case 
Kakhaber Esebua, Deputy Head of Defence System Analysis Division, Defence 
Planning and Development Department, Department of Defence of Georgia 
 
• Russian “Gybrid Warfare” uses the normal Russian approach but with the 
elements used in different intensities. They are different portions of the 
same pie chart, used like a graphic equaliser but still with the traditional 
Russian aim of striking deeply over a broad front: 
 
 
  
10 
 
Dimensions Actors Actions (operations) 
History and myth 
Religion 
Economy 
Military 
Information 
Cyber 
Academia 
Church 
State/Private 
Army, Militia, Security 
Service, Private Military 
Companies 
Media 
Diplomatic 
Documentaries 
Historical Literature 
Local and International 
Pressure 
Direct, covert actions 
 
 
SESSION 4: Russia and Hybrid Warfare 
 
Key Note: Understanding Russia: military capability, reforms and 
threat perceptions 
Daivis Petraitis, Independent Defence Analyst, Lithuania.  
 
• The Russian Government arguably bases its thinking around four ‘Russian 
truths’: 
 
o ‘War is eternal’. 
o War is fought by the state and not (just) the military of a state. 
o ‘You fight your way, I fight mine’. 
o Victory does not require the capture or occupation of 
territory…’you have a territory, you have a problem … you have 
the king, you have the territory’. 
 
• In completing its last ‘Zapad’ exercise this year, Russia was able to test all 
three of its strategic exercise objectives: 
 
o The conduct of a sudden attack. 
o The ability to defend and then terminate a conflict. 
o Wide scale state defence employing all the forces of the state; 
with the ability to escalate up to nuclear war in case of failure. 
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• Besides its existing brigades, Russia is also moving towards  re-establishing 
a divisional level within its Armed Forces as a possible framework for the 
use of its combat brigades in larger scale operations. The new Russian 
Defence Management Centre is the main state command and control centre, 
allowing Russia the ability to analyse any situation and run operations 
continuously. 
 
 
Asymmetric Measures in the Russian Security Strategy 
Katri Pynnöniemi, University of Helsinki and National Defence University 
 
• Some of the key concepts in the latest Russian National Security Strategy 
include sovereignty, independence and state and territorial integrity. 
 
• Threats to Russian National Security include ‘direct and indirect possible 
harm to the national interest’. 
 
• From a Russian government perspective, the various colour revolutions are 
seen as regime changes organised by outside forces. The free flow of 
information championed by the West is also seen as information warfare 
and as part of a geopolitical struggle. 
 
• A Russian asymmetric approach is characterised by flexibility and various 
asymmetric measures united by a common goal and actions, aimed at 
reducing the threat and eventually preventing it. The approach is defensive 
but includes both preventative and ‘active’ measures. 
 
 
Hybrid Warfare – short or middle range theory?   
Håkan Gunneriusson, SEDU 
 
• Hybrid Warfare says more about the West than it does about Russia.  Russia 
plays on the lack of desire on the part of western nations to engage in 
existential conflict due to their unwillingness to sacrifice their high standard 
of living. 
 
12 
• Western countries accept and even facilitate Russian ‘tactical truths’ 
because they choose not to call out disinformation as it would hurt their 
economic rationality. Meanwhile, Russia uses reflexive control to paint the 
West as weak. 
 
• Where is the Western threshold in the context of conflict and legal/illegal 
activity? 
 
•   
• Russian disinformation is an interactive process that requires both the actor 
and the audience.  Putin is an artist and we (the western states) are the 
consumer! 
 
• In a sense, we are in an era of post-modern warfare, where war is only war 
if both sides say so.  ‘War’ is therefore reduced to a matter of opinion. 
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The logic of Russian asymmetric warfare 
Peter Mattson, SEDU 
 
• Russia adopts asymmetric means because it has to. 
 
• Its methods include technological means, will power, moral authority and 
organisational ability. The dimensions within which these methods operates 
vary: 
 
o Positive or negative. 
o Short or long duration. 
o Low or high risk. 
o Discrete or integrated. 
o Material or psychological. 
 
 
Russian Hybrid Warfare in Georgia: lessons learned 
Niklas Nilsson, SEDU 
 
• Russia continues to exert economic leverage on Georgia today through the 
reopening of trade. Georgia is less vulnerable in the energy sector as 90 
percent of the gas consumed comes from Azerbaijan. 
 
• Politically, Russia can also use South Ossetia and Abkhazia as levers with 
Georgia. On the softer side, NGOs are also used by Russia to facilitate 
Russian-Georgian links. 
 
• Russia aims to debunk the idea of Georgia as a beacon of democracy and to 
instead paint it as a traditional post-Soviet country. It also seeks to suggest 
that links with the West are damaging to Georgia. In particular, Russia plays 
on scepticism about whether the West will really ‘deliver’. 
 
• Currently, the picture in Georgia is one of increasing vulnerability. This 
may not be the reality but there is an increasing perception that this is the 
case, with increasing numbers susceptible to the messages described above. 
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Session 4 Conclusions: 
 
• Ukraine perhaps shows the limits of Russian Hybrid Warfare: once Western 
actors actively called out hybrid activity and named Russia as the 
aggressor, it became possible to apply real countermeasures (primarily in 
the form of economic sanctions).  
 
• Seeking to ‘fight’ the results of Hybrid Warfare in a reactive manner plays 
to the strengths and not the weaknesses of the hybrid opponent. Instead, 
western nations should seek to retain the initiative and should continue to 
play to their very significant – perhaps even overwhelming - strengths (for 
example economic). They should also recognise and focus on the Centres of 
Gravity and vulnerabilities of hybrid opponents when countering the hybrid 
threat. 
 
• Western nations should develop a more robust Command and Control 
structure to deal with transnational Hybrid Warfare. This should include 
partnering with organisations (like the EU) that have the ability to 
coordinate international responses to the threats, even if they remain 
dependent on national mechanisms for delivery. 
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SESSION 5: Hybrid war and threats: the legal grey area 
 
 
Key Note: Propaganda (as a component of hybrid warfare) and 
accountability 
 
Anthony Paphiti, Brig (rtd) UK Army 
 
• Propaganda is information, especially information of a biased or misleading 
nature.  It is used to promote a political cause or point of view and to change 
perceptions. Misinformation is false or misleading information which is 
passed on in good faith. Disinformation is information known to be false 
and wilfully disseminated. 
 
• Propaganda is an integral component of military deception and a critical 
tool of hybrid warfare. This fact is illustrated by recent developments in 
Libya, Syria and Iraq, as well as historical examples.  
 
• A battle for the narrative is an essential component of hybrid warfare. Its 
objectives are multi-faceted: the “home” population; the enemy’s military 
and the enemy’s civilian population; and wider audiences of friendly 
nations from whom it is intended to garner international support. 
 
• Media plays an increasingly important role in conveying government 
propaganda messages in pursuit of a military objective. 
 
• Journalists can be embedded into military headquarters to control the 
information flow in return for force protection, coincidentally exploiting the 
journalistic pressure for a scoop.   
• The pressure of 24-hour news channels and social media has arguably made 
it less likely that journalists will scrutinise unofficial sources and verify the 
facts contained in reports received from them. This, in turn, makes it easier 
to push out a false or misleading narrative through the media. 
 
• In time of conflict, the media tend to support their government’s line (“it’s 
better to be viewed as a foot soldier for Bush than a spokeswoman for Al 
16 
Qaeda “, Irene Briganti, Fox News spokeswoman). The question is, how far 
should this go? 
 
• To maintain credibility and integrity, media must scrutinize political 
statements and hold decision makers accountable. 
 
• The legal provisions for countering propaganda are weak – the ICCPR 
prohibits propaganda for war, but most countries have entered reservations 
to this provision, citing freedom of expression. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in practice only prohibits propaganda 
promoting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. By contrast, 
this falls far short of the sort of provisions in domestic laws to cover e.g. 
hate speech and support for terrorism. 
 
• There is a need for increased coordination between Western organizations 
on strategic communication. 
 
• People frequently rely on misinformation/disinformation even after it has 
been retracted. This is a phenomenon known as “the continued-influence 
effect of misinformation”. 
 
• People tend to continue to believe media statements that they have heard 
even when those  statements have been retracted; ... unless people are 
suspicious about motives surrounding the events in question. 
 
 
• The best way to counter propaganda is to tell the truth and demonstrate that 
this is indeed the case.  
 
 
Beyond “passportisation”: when legal grey areas leave the door 
open to interventionism and rewriting post-1945 principles on 
international peace and security 
Noelle Quenivet, UWE Bristol 
 
• Russia’s practice of “passportization” is more than a policy – it is an 
important geopolitical tool for creating a buffer zone. In doing do, Russia is 
taking advantage of ambiguities in post-1945 international law by 
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reinterpreting legal grey areas and changing customary international law by 
practice.  
 
• In Georgia, the provision of passports to residents in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia allowed Russia to claim a right to protect nationals abroad and 
support these regions in declaring independence from Georgia. In other 
words, Russia has created legal ‘facts’, allowing it to claim the right to 
intervene in other states.  
 
• Notably, however, these practices are not new and have been applied also 
by Western actors in a number of cases.  This has attracted far less publicity 
in the West.  
 
 
The use of force in an asymmetric conflict is not only limited to a 
soldier’s right of self-defense 
Mark Maxwell, Deputy Legal Counsel, US Africa Command 
 
• Asymmetric warfare highlights the importance of legally distinguishing 
between self-defence and the scope of violence a soldier can use under the 
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).  
 
• Self-defence is a natural law concept – we can protect our right to life at 
anytime, anywhere.  States have different definitions of how broad this right 
of self-defence is, but it is based on direct threat and scopes and defines the 
right to use force by the soldier to negate the threat(s).  When acting in self-
defence, the legally authorized amount of force is limited.  
 
• LOAC, however, allows states to assign soldiers the right to kill persons 
who do not present direct threats if identified as combatants. In asymmetric 
warfare, threats emerge among those who appear to be civilians. The 
concept of a civilian taking a “direct participation in hostilities” is important 
because it allows soldiers to target and kill those committing or preparing 
hostile or warlike acts against the State’s war efforts.    
 
• It is important to make this distinction because most liberal democracies 
cannot send troops into conflict with only the right of self-defence: soldiers 
need a clear understanding under the LOAC as to what status a civilian 
takes when that civilian is taking direct participation in hostiles. As one 
example, the LOAC defines proportionality very differently than its 
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definition within self-defence, giving the soldier much more discretion in 
using force against a civilian’s hostile or warlike acts.   
 
• Civilians directly participating in hostilities -- DPH -- can also be targeted 
under the concept of self-defence but this type of threat is limited to the 
soldier’s person or that of the soldier’s unit. However, violence inflicted 
based on the status assigned under LOAC versus that of self-defence 
profoundly changes the narrative of the conflict. Targeting someone under 
DPH is an offensive measure while self-defence is defensive in nature. 
 
• It is important to understand the grey area between these concepts of law; 
and between the status of soldiers and the enemy combatants they are 
fighting, including civilians taking direct participation in hostilities.   
 
 
Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare – the use of law as a weapon in the 
context of hybrid warfare 
Sasha Bachmann, Bournemouth University 
 
• The concept of hybrid warfare is not new as a concept of warfare but serves 
as a new platform that allows the discussion of threats beyond the concepts 
of war, peace and kinetic warfare. The definition of Hybrid warfare should 
remain open as a means to discuss other non-kinetic methods such as 
lawfare and information operations, both of which have the potential to 
become fully fledged new warfighting domains.  
• Lawfare is a warfighting domain on its own. Lawfare refers to the use 
and/or abuse of the rule of law in a defensive and offensive capacity to 
achieve operational success without the need to employ kinetic methods of 
warfighting. There is no operational lawfare unit at NATO level but there 
are some member states which have such offensive/defensive capabilities.  
• Russia is essentially mirroring the West when it comes to lawfare – arguing 
that they were responding to lawfare threats posed by the West.  
 
 
Session 5 Conclusions: 
 
• Is there a need to address the problem of communicating with actors that 
will never recognize the law, such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and others? Should 
this be done and if so how?  
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• While these actors can be assigned the status of belligerents and thereby 
targetted, they exist worldwide and need to be addressed through broader 
approaches. We need to find ways to address the problem of sovereign 
states allowing violence on their territories according to different unified 
definitions of status. It is legally difficult to counter insurgent ideology. 
Some organizations can operate under the radar without consequences 
since hostile actions cannot be connected to them. Soldiers need training to 
know that they are exercising the status assigned to them by the state. 
Otherwise, we risk prolonging the war. 
 
 
SESSION 6: Total defence cooperation 
 
Deterrence through resilience: NATO, the nations and the 
challenges of being prepared 
Guillaume Lasconjarias, NATO Defence College 
 
• We need to understand how NATO shifted from countering HW to enhance 
resilience. The shift from countering hybrid threats and warfare to 
enhancing resilience can nevertheless be questioned. From the Alliance 
perspective, how did we slowly evolve from hybrid threats to resilience, 
which at first glance seem to be very different from NATO’s core tasks? 
The answer perhaps lies in the notion that the long-existing separation 
between defence and security has vanished, blurring responses and ensuring 
that they are not sufficiently holistic. For NATO, the countering of hybrid 
threats has largely been limited to “civilian preparedness”. 
 
• The journey from dealing with hybrid threats to instituting resilience 
mirrors the current evolution of NATO, and is also reflected by the EU’s 
parallel course. The need to strengthen defence capabilities both at home 
and on Europe’s frontline calls for a more comprehensive approach that has 
been more evident since 2014. Despite this, the main critique is that rather 
than going from strategic intention into the elaboration of ways and means, 
progress has been the other way around. First responses have been 
hampered by improvisation, with the emphasis on ad hoc solutions using 
existing conventional capabilities. 
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• If we really want to develop a deterrent against hybrid threats, we cannot 
only focus on “hardware” and “fixing” things. Because hybrid warfare 
entails a strong ‘battle for the narrative’, one of the future battlefields is our 
populations and elite’s mindset and the harnessing of a new defensive spirit. 
 
 
NATO and Hybrid Warfare 
Hans Andersen, Allied Command Transformation, Virginia 
 
• NATO: HW is not new. What is new is that it has moved from the 
operational to the strategic level, underpinned by new dimensions such as: 
globalization; complex geostrategic environment; advanced technologies 
(cyber); and information demand. 
• Russia is always inside the western OODA-loop by being swift in its 
decision making. NATO needs an agreement between its member states to 
mitigate the organisation’s long decision processes. 
 
• What is Hybrid Warfare?  Characteristic include: 
o Part of an overall Strategic Plan 
o Highly integrated (synchronized) 
o Combination of conventional and unconventional means 
o Overt and covert activities, military, paramilitary, irregular and 
civilian actors 
o Directed at an adversary’s vulnerabilities 
o Complicating decision making 
o Across the full DIMEFIL spectrum  
o Creating ambiguity and denial 
o Both State and Non-State actor 
o Employed in conflict and confrontation that fall short of armed 
conflict. 
o Globalization and technological advances has led to increased 
vulnerabilities. 
o Increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks 
o Far reaching complex propaganda and disinformation campaigns 
o Targeted and coordinated political and economic pressure. 
o Moved to the Strategic Level. 
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• The 3 pillars of NATO response vs hybrid: 1) Prepare, 2) Deter, 3) Defend. 
 
• The EU is important for NATO as dealing with hybrid threats needs to be 
part of a collective effort.  
 
 
Special Forces and hybrid scenarios: “Diplomat warriors” in small states and 
medium powers 
Njord Wegge, NUPI 
 
• Future warfare scenarios increasingly focus on how conventional and 
unconventional measures might be applied together. Special Operation 
Forces (SOF) have a particularly important role in different Hybrid Warfare 
scenarios in states of a small or middle power size.  
 
• Small/medium size states like Norway and Sweden can, and should consider 
to develop SOF designated to counter warfare also in the political, societal 
and diplomatic domain. Such a development might demand the 
development of new legal mandates and involve parts of the emergency and 
contingency apparatus. 
 
• Possibilities for life-time careers as SOF should be investigated and new 
career opportunities for the age 40+ should be developed.  
 
 
Session 6 Conclusions: 
 
• Deterrence against hybrid threats requires a focus on the population’s and 
elite’s mindset and the harnessing of a new defensive spirit. 
• NATO needs swifter coordination mechanisms to take control of the OODA-
loop. 
• Effective collaboration between EU and NATO is essential in efforts to 
counter hybrid threats. 
• SOF should be considered an important component in a wide range of 
hybrid scenarios in small states. 
• Find ways to make life-time careers as SOF possible.  
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Appendix 
Conference Programme 
 
Tuesday, Nov 14 
 
0840-0850 Introductory remarks, Col. Ronny Modigs, Head of the 
Department of Military Studies, Swedish Defence 
University 
0850-0900 
 
Welcome remarks by Mikael Weissmann, Swedish 
Defence University  
 
SESSION 1: The role of the armed forces 
 
0900-1040  
 
Presentations:  
1. Modelling hybrid warfare: a generic and 
holistic approach 
Patrick Cullen, Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI) 
2. Hybrid warfare in the mind of the 
Swedish officer  
Michael Gustafson, Swedish Defence 
University 
3. Hybrid threats and warfare today and 
tomorrow: bringing the army (back) in 
Mikael Weissmann, Swedish Defence 
University 
4. Adapting mission organizational constructs 
to enhance civil-military coordination to 
counter hybrid threats  
Scott Moreland, Center for Civil-Military 
Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, United 
States 
 
Chair: Håkan Gunneriusson 
1040-1110 Coffee break 
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SESSION 2: Cyber in a hybrid context 
 
1110-1225 
 
 
Presentations: 
1. Theory of strategic culture – a tool to 
explain Russian cyber threat perception? 
Col. Martti J. Kari, University of Jyväskylä, 
Finland 
2. Estonian defence league cyber unit as a 
hybrid national security actor 
Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology, 
Estonia 
3. The silicon hat hacker: using reinforcement 
learning in hybrid warfare  
Wayne Dalton, Stellenbosch University, South 
Africa 
 
Chair: Niklas Nilsson 
1225-1325 Lunch 
 
SESSION 3: Russia’s neighbours 
 
1325-1425 Cyber component of asymmetric warfare: the Georgian 
experience Marina Malvenishvili, Chief specialist of 
development and foreign affairs section, Cyber Security 
Bureau, Ministry of Defence of Georgia 
 
Hybrid war and the Abkhazian case  
Kakhaber Esebua, Deputy chief of division, defence 
system analysis division, Defence Planning and 
Development Department, Ministry of Defence of 
Georgia 
 
Discussion 
 
Chair: Niklas Nilsson 
1425-1455 Coffee break 
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SESSION 4: Russia and hybrid warfare 
 
1455-1720 
 
KEY NOTE: Understanding Russia: military 
capability, reforms and threat perceptions  
Daivis Petraitis, Independent Defence Analyst, 
Lithuania 
 
Presentations: 
1. Asymmetric measures in the Russian 
Security Strategy  
Katri Pynnöniemi, University of Helsinki and 
National Defence University, Finland 
2. Hybrid warfare – short or middle range 
theory? 
Håkan Gunneriusson, Swedish Defence 
University 
3. The logic of Russian asymmetric warfare 
Peter Mattson, Swedish Defence University 
4. Russian hybrid warfare in Georgia: 
lessons learned 
Niklas Nilsson, Swedish Defence University 
 
Chair: Mikael Weissmann 
 
Wednesday, Nov 15 
 
 
SESSION 5: Hybrid War and Threats: the legal grey area  
 
0845-1045 KEY NOTE: Propaganda (as a component of 
hybrid warfare) and accountability 
Anthony Paphiti, Brig (rtd) UK Army. One 
of the founding members of the British Army 
Prosecuting Authority. 
 
Presentations: 
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1. Beyond Passportisation: when legal 
grey areas leave the door open to 
interventionism and rewriting post-
1945 principles on international peace 
and security 
Noelle Quenivet, UWE Bristol, United 
Kingdom 
2. The use of force in an asymmetric 
conflict is not only limited to a soldier’s 
right of self-defense 
Mark Maxwell, Deputy Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Africa Command, 
United States 
3. Hybrid warfare and lawfare – 
the use of law as a weapon in the 
context of hybrid warfare. 
Sascha Dov Bachmann, 
Bornemouth University, United 
Kingdom 
 
Chair: Håkan Gunneriusson 
1045-1115 Coffee break 
 
SESSION 6: Total defence cooperation  
 
1115-1230 Presentations: 
1. NATO and Hybrid 
Warfare 
Hans Andersen (LtCol), 
Allied Command 
Transformation, ACT, 
Virginia 
2. Deterrence through 
resilience: NATO, the 
nations and the 
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challenges of being 
prepared 
Guillaume Lasconjarias, 
NATO Defence College, 
Rome, Italy 
3. Special forces and hybrid 
scenarios: “Diplomat 
warriors” in small states 
and medium powers 
Njord Wegge, Norwegian 
Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI) 
 
Chair: Per Thunholm 
1230-1245 Conclusion 
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Abstracts 
 
Session 1 
 
Modelling hybrid warfare: a generic and holistic approach 
Patrick Cullen, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
 
The verdict on hybrid warfare (HW) is clear. Despite an unsettled 
debate over the utility of the term, its conceptual boundaries and 
proper definition, a growing trans-Atlantic consensus from actors 
including NATO and the European Union is nevertheless in 
agreement that HW represents a security problem that must be 
addressed. This chapter, based on research conducted in the 
Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 
Countering Hybrid Warfare project, moves beyond definitional 
debates to provide a security policy-oriented conceptual framework 
for understanding the whole of government/society security puzzle 
posed by HW. It discusses HW in generic terms by focusing on its 
exploitation of ambiguity and manipulation of its opponent’s response 
thresholds, HW’s emphasis on attacking its opponents at its seams 
(legal, organizational, etc.), and its creative use of non-military 
instruments of power. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
challenges HW poses for warning intelligence, and recommendations 
for mitigating these concerns.  
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Hybrid warfare in the mind of the Swedish officer: a multiple 
duality view of tactics and operational art  
Michael Gustafson, Swedish Defence University 
Understanding hybrid warfare is challenging because it comprises among other 
dimensions threats not belonging to the traditional military domain. Nevertheless, 
traditional military capabilities are said to exist in hybrid warfare, in parallel with 
irregular warfare: concepts such as guerrillas, terrorists, criminality and a dominant 
use of information and cyberwarfare. This article examines standpoints among 
Swedish officers studying at the two-year higher staff education regarding tactics and 
operational art in so-called hybrid warfare. The study is a sociological mapping of 
statements inspired by Pierre Bourdieu field theory, addressing the question of “How 
can field theory explain contemporary military thought on tactics and operational art 
in hybrid warfare?”.  
The results show that military views on hybrid warfare can be distributed as a field 
with opposite opinions of the same challenge. This field can be expressed in the 
following way; a larger group of officers stated preferences for infantry unit concepts 
in a blended military and civilian context. A smaller group argued preferences to 
ranger unit concepts in a mainly military context. Even more varied thought was 
expressed by a smaller, group of officers, highlighting mechanized unit concepts in a 
regular warfare context. Finally another group preferred mechanized tactics and 
operation in a blended military and civilian context. Also with in each tactical type 
Different views also appeared within each tactical type. A multiple duality of views 
can thus be argued to exist in this field, with a potential of shaping different 
preconditions for collaboration, comprehensive approaches, leadership, planning and 
execution of operations.  
 
Hybrid threats and warfare today and tomorrow: bringing the 
army (back) in 
Mikael Weissmann, Swedish Defence University 
The aim of this article is to outline what the hybrid/asymmetric threats and warfare 
scenarios are for Sweden today and tomorrow. It is argued that Sweden needs to 
prepare for and act against asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare scenarios (alleged 
on‐going and in the future, violent and nonviolent). The focus is on the role and 
challenges of the Swedish army, who are arguably  a key target/actor hybrid warfare 
scenarios.  
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The paper will focus on 1) how the threats are perceived by the Swedish armed forces 
in general and the army in particular, 2) what can the army do, and 3) what should the 
army be able to do (and not do)? To make the picture as comprehensive as possible, 
the study combines analysis of official discourse in official documents, including 
doctrines and the ongoing public debates among pundits and experts, with qualitative 
and structured interviews with army officers. The focus in the interviews will be on 
operationalisation: what CAN the army do, what SHOULD the army be able to do, 
what should it NOT BE ABLE TO DO, and HOW does it get to where it want to be? 
 
Adapting mission organizational constructs to enhance civil-
military coordination to counter hybrid threats 
Scott Moreland, Center for Civil-Military Relations, US Naval 
Postgraduate School 
Hybrid threats exploit operational, informational, and legal ambiguities and 
vulnerabilities across all domains. National organizations and regional security 
consortiums, including NATO and the European Union, seek more effective 
responses to these increasingly difficult challenges. The comprehensive approach is 
an important conceptual framework for ‘whole of society’ security cooperation. 
Although not uniformly defined or perfectly understood, the basic principles of a 
comprehensive approach can be successfully applied to current and future operations 
involving military, civilian, and private sector components. 
Hybrid threats depend on our perceived lack of agility, flexibility, and resolve. 
Contemporary missions - including peacekeeping, cyber security, and maritime 
security - have developed modestly effective models for the practical application of a 
comprehensive approach; these can be adapted and applied to counter hybrid threats. 
Through existing and evolving organizational models, collective capabilities must be 
better coordinated via mutual trust and understanding, enhanced interoperability, and 
unassailable transparency. 
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Session 2 
 
Theory of strategic culture: a tool to explore russian cyber threat 
perception? 
Col. Martti J. Kari, University of Jyväskylä, Finland 
The interest in cyber warfare has generated the need for theoretical tools to research 
cyber threats and our responses to these threats. This paper reviews how the Cold War 
theories on the use of nuclear weapons, such as zero- sum game theory, theory of 
strategic culture and deterrence theory, can explain state behaviour in a cyber 
environment. I argue in this paper that the theory of strategic culture is suitable for 
exploring and explaining Russia’s cyber threat perception. The theory of strategic 
culture seeks to identify factors which are characteristic of decision making and state 
practice; and to study how and why these factors influence the state´s decision making 
and practices. Factors influencing the strategic thinking of a state, i.e. determinants of 
strategic culture might for example be historical, geopolitical, religious or ideological. 
Elements of Russian strategic culture, including a sense of vulnerability, the idea of 
Russia as besieged fortress, the mythology of permanent war and technological 
inferiority can also be identified in Russia’s cyber threat perception.   
 
Estonian defence league cyber unit as a hybrid national security actor 
Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia 
Estonian national defence relies on a combination of a professional military, 
conscription-based reserve component and a volunteer organization called Defence 
League (Kaitseliit). In 2011 the Defence League gained a new capability in the form 
of the Cyber Unit (CU), which focuses on the cyber security aspects of national 
defence. While the term Hybrid Threat has received ominous and negative undertones 
in recent years, the Defence League in general and the CU in particular can serve as 
positive examples of Hybrid Actors in the context of national defence. This paper 
provides an overview of the role of the CU in Estonia and discusses its properties and 
capabilities against the backdrop of hybrid warfare. 
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The silicon hat hacker: using reinforcement learning in hybrid 
warfare  
Wayne Dalton, Computer Information Systems Department, Faculty 
of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, South Africa 
Computers today can learn things, on their own. 20 years ago, computers were 
capable of mastering human-like behaviour, but needed a lot of human expertise to 
guide their performance.  Today, advances in machine learning have made it possible 
for computers to master very complex problems without relying on the encoding of 
human expertise into their algorithms. Recently, machine learning has successfully 
enabled computers to learn things that their human programmers themselves are 
unable to do; like discover new molecules that might lead to new drugs (Markoff, 
2012). 
Computers are also vulnerable to being exploited by hostile third-parties for a wide 
range of reasons, including cybercrime and cyber warfare. This endangers the safety 
and security of individuals, corporations and nation states in ways that are hard to 
protect against using conventional methods.  Some companies have proverbially “set 
a thief to catch a thief” by employing large numbers of ethical hackers and other 
professionals to “pen test” their own critical infrastructure. Their goal is finding and 
fixing vulnerabilities in their systems before hostile attackers can exploit them. 
 
This paper proposes that a computer can, in a self-sufficient and proactive manner, 
determine whether critical infrastructure is vulnerable to known cyber security 
exploits. The goal would be to remedy these exploits before anyone else can make use 
of them. The “silicon-hat hacker” is a machine-learning program that can explore and 
exploit vast quantities of data and consequently make high-confidence predictions on 
the existence of security exploits. This paper introduces the reader to reinforcement 
learning and how it might be used in cyber security. Finally, the paper will propose an 
architectural framework on how to accomplish this application of reinforcement 
learning to cyber security. In hybrid warfare, the complementary collaboration 
between Man and Machine will enhance capability and ultimately security and peace. 
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Session3 
 
Cyber Component of Asymmetric Warfare: Georgian 
Experience Marina Malvenishvili, Chief specialist of development 
and foreign affairs section, Cyber Security Bureau, Ministry of 
Defence of Georgia 
In August 2008, Russia perfectly demonstrated its doctrinal vision of warfare in the 
information age. Large-scale cyber-attacks against Georgia, conducted simultaneously 
with the kinetic war, presented the first application of the new “Russian hybrid” – 
mutually supporting efforts of information, cyber and kinetic operations. The 
Georgian case is significant in that it was the first instance where cyber means were 
used in direct connection with and in and support of major military operations as part 
of a state to state conventional war. This makes Russia’s cyber-attacks against 
Georgia a unique case in the cybersecurity sphere. Russia, for the first time in history, 
tested Georgian cyber capabilities, using numerous attacks against both the public and 
private sectors. Importantly, the preparation for war started not in August, but months 
and even years earlier. Georgia has always been in Russia’s “sphere of privileged 
interests”.  
 
Hybrid War and the Abkhazian Case  
Kakhaber Esebua, Deputy chief of division, defence system analysis 
division, Defence Planning and Development Department, Ministry 
of Defence of Georgia 
 
Hybrid Warfare has dozens of definitions and most of them are contradicting. The 
purpose of this paper is not to define the term in general but to talk about its Russian 
version. Hybrid Warfare is quite similar to the Russian notion of regular war; it 
consists of exactly the same components. The difference is that those components are 
employed in significantly different proportions and intensity. For a better 
understanding of Russian warfare we need to define (1) the dimensions (battlespaces) 
of Russian warfighting; (2) the actors employed; and (3) the actions (types of 
operations) conducted. Usually, the battlespaces of Russian warfare are: History and 
Myths, Religion, Economy, Military, Information and Cyber. War is fought in all 
those dimensions either simultaneously, in combinations, or alone, depending on the 
environment or the desired end state. Russian warfare is highly flexible and there are 
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no clear lines between its different forms – Hybrid and conventional. Hybrid is a 
comparably new type of Russian warfare, which is partially based on the concept of 
the Soviet Deep Battle. It means that Russia is operating in the entire depth of the 
enemy defence but not only in the military but other dimensions as well. The so-called 
Gerasimov Doctrine, which is widely seen as a bible of Russian Hybrid War is also 
talking about multidimensional war and underlines that this is not a Russian invention. 
Indeed, Hybrid War is neither entirely Russian, nor did it begin in Donbass. This 
paper analyses Russian Hybrid Warfare during the conflict in Abkhazia in the 1990s, 
which is still widely referred to as a separatist conflict. Yet in reality, it was an 
instance of Russian Hybrid Warfare against Georgia. 
 
 
Session 4 
 
Asymmetric measures in the Russian Security Strategy  
Katri Pynnöniemi, University of Helsinki and National Defence 
University, Finland 
 
Since the 2014 Crimean operation, Western military analysts have reviewed Russian 
military thinking in an attempt to both distinguish novel features and traditional 
patterns in the Russian ways of war. This research has drawn attention to concepts of 
‘nonlinearity’, full-spectrum war, an ‘asymmetric approach’, and more recently to 
‘strategic deterrence’. Two of these concepts appear in the National Security Strategy, 
namely the asymmetric approach and strategic deterrence. In fact, the strategy ties 
these two concepts together in a way that tells a lot about the Russian approach to 
conflict. The ‘asymmetric approach’ has a rich history in Western military thought.[1] 
What I argue here is that its current usage in the Russian context can be traced to 
lessons drawn by the retired army general and the President of the Academy of 
Military Science, Makhmut Gareev after Russia’s “five day war” with Georgia. The 
                                                                        
[1] B. H. Liddlell Hart, Strategy: Second Revised Edition, NY: Penguin 
Books, 1991. 
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paper will discuss the evolution of this ‘asymmetric approach’ in the national security 
strategy (2009 and 2015). 
 
Hybrid warfare – short or middle range theory? 
Håkan Gunneriusson, Swedish Defence University 
What is new about Russian hybrid warfare is that the West EU/NATO accepts the 
narrative that Russia is not at war in Ukraine. There are several reasons for this but 
one important thing to understand is that it is more about the West than about Russia. 
Russia is using reflexive control so that the West opts out from calling out Russia as a 
warring party in Ukraine. Why so?  Because in a globalized Post-Cold War world 
there is no economic rationality in waging an existential war; and certainly not against 
a locally strong adversary that also possesses nuclear weapons and gives the 
impression of standing its ground if push comes to shove. Stating that Russia is at war 
with Ukraine would lead the West to act in accordance with the convention against 
War of Aggression. This would escalate the conflict and no one is interested in this 
outcome.  
Yet there is more to this than Russia’s relative strength and the West’s focus on 
economic rationality. Each of these factors can be seen in the terms of Fernand 
Braudel as a Courte Durée (that Russia’s relative military might will equal that of the 
West) and a Moyenne Durée (that the West’s positivistic economic pursuit might one 
again become balanced by a more autonomous political rationality). However, there is 
further a current change in the perception of singular truth in society, which makes the 
interpretation of war and the relativisation of war easier. This is not a temporary 
(Courte) change.  
 
The Logic of Russian Asymmetric Warfare 
Peter Mattson, Swedish Defence University 
Correlation of forces has always had a significant importance in Russian military 
thinking. In comparison to American military economy and power, Russia is not even 
close to being superior. Russia cannot meet the overwhelming American military 
capabilities with its own military weakness. This explains why the Russian military 
strategic logic includes asymmetric objectives, means and methods. Asymmetry is to 
do something different than one’s adversaries in order to exploit an opponent´s 
weaknesses and to use one’s own capabilities in a smart way to maximize own 
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strength. In Russia, all national power domains are coordinated under a military 
command in the National Defense Management Center (NDMC). The asymmetric 
approach can be used on the political-strategic, military-strategic and operational 
levels, or as a combination of all of them. Asymmetry can include different methods, 
technologies, values, organizations, time separation, or a combination of some of 
them. Strategic vulnerabilities usually include national leadership, the elite of the 
administration, as well as some strategic infrastructure.   
 
Russian hybrid warfare in Georgia: lessons learned 
Niklas Nilsson, Swedish Defence University 
This paper shows how Russia has established a range of pressure points vis-à-vis 
Georgia that have incrementally circumscribed the Georgian government’s political 
room for manoeuvre, both internationally and domestically. These pressure points 
have included: the use of military force or the threat thereof; leveraging geopolitical 
realities on the ground as means to exert diplomatic pressure; and the exploitation of 
economic dependencies. They have also encompassed subversive elements, including: 
co-optation and subversion aimed at inserting agents of influence in Georgia’s 
political elite and society; cyber-attacks; and a concerted effort in the informational 
sphere to promote a narrative of Georgia that is favourable to Russian interests, both 
in the country itself as well as among its key partners in the West.  
Georgia stands out as a particularly important case study of Russia’s deployment of 
hybrid tactics. The country’s longstanding conflict with Russia has made it a target of 
the full spectrum of hybrid tactics that Russia currently deploys in Ukraine and 
elsewhere. In fact, Georgia can be said to have functioned as a testing ground for 
many of these tactics, making Georgia’s experience relevant far beyond the confined 
regional context. 
 
 
  
36 
Session 5 
 
 
Propaganda (as a component of hybrid warfare) and 
accountability 
Anthony Paphiti, Brig (rtd) UK Army. 
From ancient Greece to Syria, the use of deception has been a key component of 
military strategy. Sun Tzu summed it up, in the Art of War, when he said that “All 
warfare is based on deception”.  
Within the realm of deception sits the concept of information operations or, more 
colloquially, propaganda. Of all the forms of hybrid warfare, propaganda ops are, 
perhaps, one of the most effective, as they may be used to change the perceptions of 
both friend and foe. In the former case, to win support for a cause. In the latter case, to 
confuse and sow seeds of doubt and fear. 
In the Second World War, the allies used deception to great effect to protect the plan 
for the Normandy landings (operation OVERLORD) from being discovered, and 
employed a number of deception ops (Operation BODYGUARD) to disguise their 
real intent. As Churchill remarked at the Tehran Conference, in November 1943, “In 
wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of 
lies”. 
In more recent times, we have seen how disinformation and half-truths have won 
nations support for war in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya and Syria. On all of these occasions, 
the media and political establishment has played its part in disseminating the 
narrative. No one has been taken to task for some of the egregious claims made, for 
example, in the case of propaganda promoting WMD in Iraq.   
In Syria, in the battle for East Aleppo, it became evident eventually that the reports 
being broadcast every evening by western media lacked  independence, as their 
sources were Nusra jihadist activists within the militant-held part of the city. Images 
of children were used to win the sympathies of world viewers, and social media was 
employed to great effect to promote fake news or skew the truth. The truth had 
become a casualty. Propaganda had had a major impact on perceptions from outside 
Syria and wooed the famous and the powerful to the Islamists’ cause: Islamists who 
were proscribed terrorist organizations listed by, inter alia, the United States and 
United Kingdom. 
37 
Where leaders, be they military or political, press a narrative for war, or journalists 
promote reports which they know or believe to be from a partisan and proscribed 
terrorist source, whether or not intentionally to support that biased narrative, is there 
any legal accountability? Does the law – international or domestic – make propaganda 
for war an offence, or is that a step too far and one which offends the right of freedom 
of expression and a free press? 
The answer, it seems, is that there are few legal constraints on propaganda which falls 
short of incitement, or aiding and abetting etc. genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity, where the intent required in relation to a consequence of the narrative is 
that the person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events. In spite of the palpable bias in some quarters of the media, 
it is doubtful that any journalist has crossed that Rubicon. Which means that the use 
of propaganda remains a key tool of hybrid warfare. 
 
Beyond passportisation: when legal grey areas leave the door open 
to interventionism and rewriting post-1945 principles on 
international peace and security 
Noelle Quenivet, UWE Bristol, United Kingdom 
By exploring Russia’s activities from the fall of the Soviet Union until the present 
day, this paper examines how Russia uses nationality (understood in a wide sense of 
the term) as a political, economic, and cultural tool to justify expansionism. Russia, so 
it seems, is using grey areas in international law to implement a policy whose legal 
implications are in breach of the key principles of the UN Charter relating to 
international peace and security. It is argued that the policies and tools (e.g. conferral 
of nationality, support for the right of self-determination, protection of nationals 
abroad, etc.) developed and used by Russia are not necessarily unlawful per se; they 
can indeed in some instances be justified under international law as they fall within 
the grey areas of international law. That being said, the situations created as a result of 
this policy are often unlawful (e.g. recognition of a State that is part of the territory of 
another State, occupation and annexation, etc.). The paper concludes that Russia, by 
using its ‘nationals’ abroad and legal grey areas, is attempting to rewrite the rules 
carefully crafted post-1945, thereby allowing for interference in neighbouring States 
to become an established international custom. 
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The use of force in an asymmetric conflict is not only limited to a soldier’s right 
of self-defense 
Mark Maxwell, Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Africa Command, 
United States 
There is a disturbing confusion among soldiers and their leaders in an asymmetric 
environment of what is the difference between the scope of authority to use lethal 
force under individual self-defence and the scope of authority to use lethal force under 
the law of armed conflict (LOAC).  From the moment of a soldier’s induction into the 
military, he or she is trained on the use of force in individual self-defence scenarios. 
Soldiers are also trained on what force can be used under LOAC. Although the two 
concepts – individual self-defence and LOAC -- might result in the use of force to kill 
or wound an enemy belligerent, they are two very different authorities. On the one 
hand, self-defence is tailored to protect the soldier from harm posed by a threat. The 
enemy’s threat can be neutralized by a soldier’s force that is proportional to the 
enemy threat; so if the enemy is threatening the soldier’s life or limb, then lethal force 
would be appropriate and authorized. But if the threat is something lesser than life or 
limb, than the corresponding force should be lesser. Individual self-defence is 
defensive: again, it responds to a threat. The use of force under LOAC, on the other 
hand, is the State giving the soldier the right to be its agent so that the State can win 
the armed conflict. The State’s grant of authority to the soldier under LOAC is to kill 
individuals who have been given the status of an enemy belligerent.  Historically, an 
enemy belligerent is a member of the enemy’s military. In the modern-day 
asymmetric environment, the enemy is often a civilian – or an individual pretending 
to be a civilian – who takes a direct participation in hostilities. The civilian steps out 
of his protective status as a civilian and decides to become an enemy belligerent by 
taking direct participation in hostilities; that is, he can be targeted under LOAC, even 
if he is not a threat to the individual soldier.   
In many scenarios, the soldier is able to use lethal force under both under both 
concepts: individual self-defence and LOAC’s civilians taking direct part in 
hostilities. But the degree of force under each concept is profoundly different. For 
example, a civilian takes part in hostilities by shooting at a soldier. After shooting, the 
civilian drops his weapon and starts to run away. There is real dispute if a soldier can 
shoot the civilian under the concept of individual self-defence; the threat posed by the 
civilian has evaporated. However, there is no issue under LOAC: the soldier can shoot 
the civilian because the civilian has taken the status of an enemy belligerent. So the 
degree of force might be different depending on which authority the soldier applies; 
but also, there are scenarios where both concepts do not overlap. For example, an 
aggrieved father of an innocent victim attacks a soldier out of remorse – the soldier’s 
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right to respond falls squarely under individual self-defence. To the other extreme, a 
civilian helping to place an improvised explosive device (IED) in a road used by 
civilians is taking direct participation in hostilities. The intent of the IED is to prevent 
governance by funnelling civilians away from government-provided services. 
Friendly forces are not in the area, so individual self-defence is not applicable; 
however, LOAC concepts of targeting still apply and the civilian can be lethally 
targeted; it is part of the military’s mission accomplishment to the win the conflict.   
Understanding both concepts have three long-term advantages that will assist both the 
nation and military to navigate the use of force in these type of asymmetric conflicts. 
First, on a strategic level, it would help educate the Nation and its polity who are 
sending troops into harm’s way that there are delineations between defensive 
measures, which a soldier always possesses under self-defence, and offensive 
measures, which will allows the soldier to win the nation’s armed conflict.  Second, 
on an operational level, it would compel militaries to train and educate their military 
force on the conceptual difference between the defensive use of force under individual 
self-defence – which is inherent - and the offensive use of force under LOAC – which 
is granted by the State to the individual soldier; this training will solidify the soldier’s 
understanding of what force he or she is able to use under both concepts. In turn and 
thirdly, on a tactical level, this training would help the soldier understand both his 
limits and the expanse of his authority to use force on the battlefield.   
 
Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare – the use of law as a weapon in the 
context of Hybrid Warfare. 
Sascha Dov Bachmann, Bornemouth University, SEDU and 
CEMIS, Stellenbosch University 
Hybrid Warfare is an old, multifaceted method of war where different actors, state and 
non-state, aim to reach their political or military goals by using a mix of conventional 
and non-conventional, or irregular, methods, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic means. 
Hybrid Warfare has become increasingly sophisticated and deadly (often involving 
cyberwarfare, propaganda and non-state adversary), and the methods used has a long 
history of successful employment. Similarly, Lawfare (the use of law as a weapon) is 
defined as “the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military 
means to achieve an operational objective”. Lawfare therefore encompasses both 
affirmative as well as malicious use and has a goal of manipulating law by changing 
legal paradigms (from 
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https://www.academia.edu/34320799/Briefing_paper_Lawfare_in_Hybrid_Wars_The
_21st_Century_Warfare). 
 
 
Session 6  
 
From Countering Hybrid Threats to Developing Resilience: New (shifting) 
Priorities for NATO? 
Guillaume Lasconjarias, NATO Defence College, Rome, Italy 
For NATO, the Ukraine crisis has been called a “wake-up call” redefining not just the 
relationships to Russia but the whole idea of living in a Europe free and at peace. To 
deal with security challenges emanating from its Eastern and Southern neighborhood, 
NATO has adopted the concept of “hybrid warfare”, designing the combination of 
means that could undermine a government’s and nation’s ability to properly protect 
and rule over its population. Because these threats tackle domains that are outside the 
purely defensive area of responsibility, there’s a need of a holistic response. For 
NATO, countering of hybrid threats has therefore been extended to increasing 
“civilian preparedness”, packaged in the rejuvenated concept of resilience. For the 
Allies, it underlines the enduring ability to keep functioning in the face of internal or 
external change. This “resilience pledge” has been endorsed at the Warsaw summit in 
July 2016 which further proves the slow shift from countering hybrid threats and 
warfare to enhancing resilience. 
 
Special forces and hybrid scenarios “Diplomat warriors” in small 
states and medium powers 
Njord Wegge, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
Future warfare scenarios increasingly focus on how conventional and unconventional 
measures might be applied together in what has been labelled “Hybrid Warfare”. In 
such scenarios an opponent tries to reach his political goals through the synchronized 
use of different instruments of power tailored to vulnerabilities within the whole of 
society, while not going above what has traditionally been described as the threshold 
of war (e.g. a NATO article V scenario).  
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This research project investigates the potential role of Special Operation Forces (SOF) 
in Hybrid warfare scenarios in states of a small or middle power size. Based on 
research on the advantages of SOFs in future hybrid warfare scenarios, combined with 
insight into two relevant cases, Norway and Sweden, potential new roles of SOFs in 
Hybrid Threat scenarios will be analysed.  
The Project concludes by first by supporting the idea that small/medium size states 
like Norway and Sweden can, and should, develop SOFs designated for warfare also 
in the political, societal and diplomatic domain; while secondly also pointing out that 
such a development might demand development of new legal mandates and a 
reorganization of parts of the emergency and contingency apparatus. 
